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Four Common Misconceptions About
Copyright Piracy
PETER K. Yu*
I. INTRODUCTION
Copyright piracy is one of the most difficult, yet important,
transnational problems in the twenty-first century. In 2002 alone,
the United States lost more than $10 billion in copyright piracy
abroad.' Given the intertwining relationship between the
copyright industries and the U.S. economy,2 these figures reveal
the unlikely truth of the piracy problem. In fact, the International
Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI) pointed out
recently that music piracy threatened 600,000 jobs in the European
music industry.3 If piracy continues at the current level, it would
* Copyright © 2003 Peter K. Yu. All Rights Reserved. Assistant Professor of Law
& Director, Intellectual Property & Communications Law Program, Michigan State
University-DCL College of Law; Adjunct Professor of Telecommunication, Information
Studies and Media & Faculty Associate, James H. and Mary B. Quello Center for
Telecommunication Management & Law, College of Communication Arts & Sciences,
Michigan State University; Research Associate, Programme in Comparative Media Law &
Policy, Centre for Socio-Legal Studies, University of Oxford. This Article is adapted from
Peter K. Yu, The Copyright Divide, 25 CARDOZO L. REv. 331 (2003). The Author would
like to thank Larry Helfer for inviting him to participate in the International Law
Weekend-West Conference at Loyola Law School in Los Angeles.
1. International Intellectual Property Alliance, USTR 2003 "Special 301" Decisions
on Intellectual Property, at http://www.iipa.com/pdf2003_June-USTRLossUpd.pdf
(June 24, 2003).
2. STEPHEN E. SIWEK, COPYRIGHT INDUSTRIES IN THE U.S. ECONOMY: THE 2002
REPORT 3-5 (2002) (providing statistics that demonstrate the significance of U.S.
copyright industries on U.S. jobs and revenue growth).
3. Simon Beavis, Record Firms Threaten Big Employers with Action to Combat
Piracy, INDEP., Jan. 21, 2003, at 19 (quoting Jay Berman, Chairman and CEO of
International Federation of the Phonographic Industry).
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not be surprising to find a similar number of American jobs
jeopardized, if not more.
Although legal literature has discussed copyright piracy
extensively, commentators rarely offer a "grand unified theory" on
this global problem. Rather, they give nuanced analyses, discussing
the many aspects of the problem-political, social, economic,
cultural, and historical. For example, when commentators talk
about piracy in China, they discuss the Confucian culture,4 the
Communist regime,5 the paranoia and xenophobia of the Chinese
leaders,6 the country's censorship policies, its lack of rule of law,8
4. See WILLIAM P. ALFORD, To STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION 57 (1995) [hereinafter
ALFORD, To STEAL A BOOK Is AN ELEGANT OFFENSE] (discussing the tension between
Confucianism and intellectual property protection in China); Patrick H. Hu, "Mickey
Mouse" in China: Legal and Cultural Implications in Protecting U.S. Copyrights, 14 B.U.
INT'L L.J. 81, 104 (1996) (stating that "many [Chinese] consider copying or imitation
'acceptable' and a 'time-honored learning process"'); Peter K. Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and
Perspectives: An Attempt to Use Shakespeare to Reconfigure the U.S.-China Intellectual
Property Debate, 19 B.U. INT'L L.J. 1, 16-21 (2001) [hereinafter Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and
Perspectives] (discussing Confucianism and cultural practices in China).
5. See ALFORD, TO STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE, supra note 4, at 64
(discussing how the Cultural Revolution and the various class struggles have made the
Chinese "unwilling to acknowledge their personal role in [creative and] inventive
activity"); Susan Tiefenbrun, Piracy of Intellectual Property in China and the Former
Soviet Union and Its Effects upon International Trade: A Comparison, 46 BUFF. L. REV. 1,
37-38 (1998) (describing how "owning property is tantamount to a sin" in a socialist
society); Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives, supra note 4, at 21-22 (discussing the
Socialist economic system in China).
6. See ALFORD, TO STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE, supra note 4, at 68
(stating that "[o]pponents of a patent system also expressed concern about the Western
'literary-industrial complex,' which some believed might . . . stifle the development of
[Chinese] indigenous science and so leave the nation dependent on the outside world
economically, scientifically and militarily."); Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives, supra
note 4, at 22-28 (discussing the self-strengthening worldview, skepticism of Western
institutions, and the xenophobic and nationalist sentiments in China).
7. See Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives, supra note 4, at 28-32 (discussing
China's censorship and information control policy). For discussions of the regulation of
media and audiovisual products in China, see generally Anna S.F. Lee, The Censorship
and Approval Process for Media Products in China, in PROTECIIG INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA 127 (Mary L. Riley ed., 1997); Mary L. Riley, The
Regulation of the Media in China, in CHINESE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: LAW AND
PRACTICE 355 (Mark A. Cohen et al. eds., 1999).
8. For discussions of the development of the rule of law in China, see generally
RONALD C. BROWN, UNDERSTANDING CHINESE COURT AND LEGAL PROCESS: LAW
WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS (1997); CHINA'S LEGAL REFORMS (Stanley Lubman
ed., 1996); DOMESTIC LAW REFORMS IN POST-MAO CHINA (Pitman B. Potter ed., 1994);
RONALD C. KEITH, CHINA'S STRUGGLE FOR THE RULE OF LAW (1994); THE LIMITS OF
THE RULE OF LAW IN CHINA (Karen G. Turner et al. eds., 2000); MURRAY SCOT
TANNER, THE POLITICS OF LAWMAKING IN POST-MAO CHINA: INSTITUTIONS,
PROCESSES AND DEMOCRATIC PROSPECTS (1999); Stanley B. Lubman, Studying
Contemporary Chinese Law: Limits, Possibilities, and Strategy, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 293
(1991).
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and its ineffective judicial system.9 Similarly, when commentators
talk about piracy on the Internet, they discuss the hacker culture,10
in particular the hackers' motto, "Information wants to be free,"' 1
as compared to the copyright industries' motto, "Information
wants to be paid." These commentators also note the lower cost
and increasing speed of reproduction 12  and the Internet's
structural resistance to government regulation.13
Even for the few who take a historical interest in pre-
industrial America, those scholars talk about the need of the
young republic to have access to books and literature without
paying exorbitant royalties to foreign-primarily British and
French -authors and publishers. They also explain how the United
States's status as a less developed country would not make
copyright protection of foreign authors cost-effective. Some even
9. See Jeffrey W. Berkman, Intellectual Property Rights in the P.R. C.: Impediments to
Protection and the Need for the Rule of Law, 15 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 1, 16 (1996)
(stating that "China's ineffective legal system remains the major impediment to protection
of intellectual property rights"); see also BROWN, supra note 8, at 97-99 (discussing
China's ineffective judicial system).
10. See generally PEKKA HIMANEN, THE HACKER ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF THE
INFORMATION AGE (2001) (discussing the hacker ethic and culture); STEVEN LEVY,
HACKERS: HEROES OF THE COMPUTER REVOLUTION (1984) (discussing the hacker
philosophy of sharing and openness and examining the evolution of the hacker culture
from the 1950s to 1980s).
11. Steward Brand was often credited for coining the phrase. David Stipp, The
Electric Kool-Aid Management Consultant, FORTUNE, Oct. 16, 1995, at 160, 166
(characterizing Stewart Brand's phrase "information wants to be free" as the
"cyberhacker rallying cry").
12. See I. Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for "Cyberspace," 55 U. PITT. L.
REV. 993, 1005 (1994) ("Photocopy machines at one time threatened to turn every
individual into a mass publisher, but cyberspace seems to have achieved that distinction in
a way that photocopying never really did."); Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative
Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U.
CHI. L. REV. 263, 264 (2002) (noting that "digital technology makes it possible to make an
unlimited number of perfect copies of music, books, or videos in digital form, and through
the Internet individuals may distribute those digital works around the world at the speed
of light."); Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 YALE L.J. 1805, 1808-
33 (1995) (arguing that the production and reproduction costs of information have been
greatly reduced by the Internet).
13. See PIPPA NORRIS, DIGITAL DIVIDE: CIVIC ENGAGEMENT, INFORMATION
POVERTY, AND THE INTERNET WORLDWIDE 100 (2001) (noting that "officials normally
find it far more difficult to silence critical voices on the new media compared with their
ability to regulate and control the TV airwaves"); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace 2.0,
79 TEX. L. REV. 447, 448 (2000) (noting that the "rudderless, decentralized, and
transnational" nature of the Internet architecture has made regulation of the Internet
inherently difficult); A. Michael Froomkin, The Internet as a Source of Regulatory
Arbitrage, in BORDERS IN CYBERSPACE: INFORMATION POLICY AND THE GLOBAL
INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE 129,140-47 (Brian Kahin & Charles Nesson eds., 1997)
(discussing the difficulties of censorship on the Internet); David R. Johnson & David G.
Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1373-74
(1996) (describing how efforts to control the flow of electronic information across physical
borders will likely fail).
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defend the country's lack of protection by noting a similar lack of
protection abroad at that time. They note that during the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, "international copyright
protection was the exception rather than the rule., 1 4
These nuanced discussions, however, are missing in the
current public debate, which tends to oversimplify the complicated
picture to capture the readers' emotion and to generate support
for proposed legislative and executive actions. The debate often
exaggerates a particular aspect of the piracy problem or offers an
abbreviated, easy-to-understand, yet misleading version of the
story. Such oversimplification is dangerous, for it creates
misconceptions that confuse the public as to the cause and extent
of the problem and misleads policymakers into finding solutions
that fail to attack the crux of the piracy problem.
In light of this shortcoming, Part II of this Article challenges
four common misconceptions about copyright piracy: (1) copyright
piracy is merely a cultural problem, (2) copyright piracy is
primarily a development issue, (3) copyright piracy is a past
phenomenon for technologically-advanced countries, and (4)
copyright piracy is a necessary byproduct of authoritarian rule.
Part III attempts to reconfigure the misguided public debate on
copyright piracy by underscoring the need to focus on the
copyright divide-the gap between those who have stakes in the
copyright regime and those who do not. Part IV concludes by
warning that the United States might not be able to eradicate the
piracy problem, unless its policymakers are willing to change the
lawmaking process by taking into account the interests of both the
stakeholders and nonstakeholders.
14. Barbara A. Ringer, The Role of the United States in International Copyright-Past,
Present, and Future, 56 GEO. L.J. 1050, 1051 (1968) [hereinafter Ringer, The Role of the
United States in International Copyright]; see also EDWARD SAMUELS, THE ILLUSTRATED
STORY OF COPYRIGHT 231 (2000) (noting that "the copyright law of many other countries
at that time was not any more protective of the rights of foreign authors" than the First
U.S. Copyright Act); Henry G. Henn, The Quest for International Copyright Protection, 39
CORNELL L.Q. 43, 43 (1953) ("Until a century ago, the general rule, with a few standout
exceptions, was that domestic works were eligible for protection and foreign works were
not." (citation omitted)); Sam Ricketson, The Birth of the Berne Union, 11 COLUM.-VLA
J.L. & ARTS 9, 12 (1986) (noting that piracy activities "had been a long-established feature
of European social and cultural life").
[Vol. 26:127
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II. THE FOUR COMMON MISCONCEPTIONS
A. Misconception #1: Copyright Piracy
Is Merely a Cultural Problem
When commentators examine the piracy problem in "foreign"
communities-including the Internet 15 -they often talk about the
cultural differences that differentiate the community from a
traditional Western society. For example, they discuss the classic
Greek and Roman beliefs that works were created through
"inspiration by the muses," 16 the Confucian underpinnings of
Chinese society, 17 the familial and community values embodied in
Islamic laws, 18 and the hacker culture that believes "Information
wants to be free."' 19 Based on these analyses, copyright piracy is
sometimes characterized as a cultural problem.
While such characterization undoubtedly highlights our
differences, it is a mistake to assume that culture is the only, or
even primary, cause of the piracy problem in these communities.
After all, communitarian philosophies are not unique to the
Greeks, Romans, Chinese, Muslims, and hackers. These
philosophies are found in civilizations around the world. It is just
as misleading to argue that extensive copyright piracy occurs in
15. As Professor Post commented about the Napster situation:
Only when Napster users believe that it is in their interest to grant recognition to
the "foreign" copyrights held by Lieber and Stoller will they do so. Only when
there is a constituency for reciprocal copyright recognition Over There, among
cyberspace's new Hawthornes, Melvilles, and Emersons, will we see it. There
may be things we can do to speed that process up; taking our cue from Dickens,
a policy of nonrecognition of cyberspace copyrights here in realspace, for
example, under which we might deny copyright protection Over Here for
software and systems developed Over There, might be an interesting place to
start.
David G. Post, His Napster Voice, in COPY FIGHTS: THE FUTURE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 107, 121 (Adam Thierer & Clyde Wayne Crews,
Jr. eds., 2002).
16. WALTER BAPPERT, WEGE ZUM URHEBERRECHT 26-39 (1962) (positing that the
classic Greeks and Romans, with pagan theories of inspiration by the muses, could not
conceive of rights based on individual authorship), quoted in Paul Edward Geller,
Copyright History and the Future: What's Culture Got to Do with It?, 47 J. COPYRIGHT
SOC'Y U.S.A. 209,213 n.19 (2000).
17. See ALFORD, To STEAL A BOOK Is AN ELEGANT OFFENSE, supra note 4, at 57;
Hu, supra note 4, at 104; Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspective, supra note 4, at 16-21.
18. See Richard E. Vaughan, Defining Terms in the Intellectual Property Protection
Debate: Are the North and South Arguing Past Each Other When We Say "Property"? A
Lockean, Confucian, and Islamic Comparison, 2 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 307, 357
(1996); PERSPECTIVES ON PLAGIARISM AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN A
POSTMODERN WORLD 66 (Lise Buranen & Alice M. Roy eds., 1999) (discussing how
some teachers attribute plagiarism by Middle Eastern students to the emphasis of
community and family values in Middle Eastern cultures).
19. See HIMANEN, supra note 10; LEVY, supra note 10.
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non-Western communities by virtue of their cultural roots as to
argue that extensive MP3 piracy occurs in Western societies
because of the communitarian underpinnings in Judeo-Christian
teachings.
Cultural barriers may make it difficult for copyright laws to
emerge or to develop. A culture-based analysis may therefore
provide insight into a community where the public has limited
understanding of these different cultures. A different or even pro-
copying culture, however, does not necessarily result in extensive
copyright piracy. For example, Professor William Alford pointed
out that China's Confucian culture militated against copyright
protection in that it did not allow intellectual property protection
to take root.20 Yet, this non-Western culture did not prevent the
adoption of laws aimed at protecting intellectual property rights in
Chinese society.21 Indeed, there is strong compatibility between
copyright and Confucianism,2 z just as there is between Western
human rights principles and Confucianism.23
Although many early members of the Internet community
subscribe to the hacker culture and the motto, "Information wants
to be free," there is no evidence that these members would steal or
undertake other illegal acts to free up information. As Professor
Jessica Litman pointed out:
20. ALFORD, To STEAL A BOOK Is AN ELEGANT OFFENSE, supra note 4, at 57.
21. See Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives, supra note 4, at 4-15 (discussing the
imposition of intellectual property rights on China by Western countries).
22. See Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners: Protecting Intellectual Property in
China in the Twenty-First Century, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 223-25 (2000) [hereinafter Yu,
From Pirates to Partners] (discussing the compatibility between the Chinese culture and
Western intellectual property notions); Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives, supra note
4, at 76-77. Compare XIANFA art. 20 (1982) ("The state promotes the development of
natural and social sciences, disseminates knowledge of science and technology, and
commends and rewards achievements in scientific research as well as technological
innovations and inventions."), and id. art. 47 ("The state encourages and assists creative
endeavors conducive to the interests of the people that are made by citizens engaged in
education, science, technology, literature, art and other cultural work."), with U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("The Congress shall have Power... [t]o promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.").
23. In the past decade, substantial research has been devoted to explore the common
grounds between human rights and the Chinese culture, in particular Confucianism. See
generally DANIEL A. BELL, EAST MEETS WEST: HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY IN
EAST ASIA (2000); CONFUCIANISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Wm. Theodore de Bary & Tu
Weiming eds., 1998); WM. THEODORE DE BARY, ASIAN VALUES AND HUMAN RIGHTS:
A CONFUCIAN COMMUNITARIAN PERSPECTIVE (1998); THE EAST ASIAN CHALLENGE
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (Joanne R. Bauer & Daniel A. Bell eds., 1999); HUMAN RIGHTS
AND CHINESE VALUES: LEGAL, PHILOSOPHICAL, AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES
(Michael C. Davis ed., 1995).
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People do seem to buy into copyright norms, but they don't
translate those norms into the rules that the copyright statute
does; they find it very hard to believe that there's really a law
out there that says the stuff the copyright law says.... People
don't obey laws that they don't believe in. It isn't necessarily
that they behave lawlessly, or that they'll steal whatever they
can if they think they can get away with it. Most people try to
comply, at least substantially, with what they believe the law to
say. If they don't believe the law says what it in fact says,
though, they won't obey it-not because they are protesting its
provisions, but because it doesn't stick in their heads.
24
So far, copyright law "doesn't stick in their heads" because it
is long, wordy, complex, cumbersome, counterintuitive, and
internally inconsistent. The law today is drafted by copyright
lawyers, who primarily represent stakeholders, negotiated through
a series of private meetings. 6 Compared to the commandment that
says "Thou shalt not steal" or "Thou shalt not kill," current
copyright law is very difficult and time-consuming to understand,
even for sophisticated copyright lawyers and veteran intellectual
property scholars. 27 The situation may change, however, if the law
24. Jessica Litman, Copyright Noncompliance (Or Why We Can't "Just Say Yes" to
Licensing), 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 237, 238-39 (1997) [hereinafter Litman, Copyright
Noncompliance]; see also Marci A. Hamilton, The TRIPS Agreement: Imperialistic,
Outdated, and Overprotective, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 613, 616 (1996) ("Intellectual
property is nothing more than a socially-recognized, but imaginary, set of fences and gates.
People must believe in it for it to be effective."); Seth Faison, China Turns Blind Eye to
Pirated Disks, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1998, at D1 ("We take copyright violations very
seriously, but when it comes to copying a disk ... most Chinese people don't see what's
wrong." (quoting Xu Guoji, a senior official in Shanghai's Industrial and Commercial
Administration)).
25. JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 73 (2001) [hereinafter LITMAN, DIGITAL
COPYRIGHT]. Ironically, the Clinton Administration claimed the passage of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act as the success of its -Framework for Global Electronic
Commerce, which called for the creation of "predictable, minimalist, consistent, and
simple" rules. WILLIAM J. CLINTON & ALBERT GORE, JR., A FRAMEWORK FOR
GLOBAL ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 3 (1997), available at
http://www.iitf.nist.gov/eleccomm/ecomm.htm; see also Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual
Property and the Digital Economy: Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to Be
Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519, 524 (1999) (supporting the notion that copyright
legislation is unnecessarily complex).
26. See Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72
CORNELL L. REV. 857, 880-82 (1987); Jessica D. Litman, Copyright Legislation and
Technological Change, 68 OR. L. REV. 275,299-305 (1989).
27. Jessica Litman pointed out:
If ordinary people are to see copyrights as equivalent to tangible property, and
accord copyright rules the respect they give to other property rules, then we
would need, at a minimum, to teach them the rules that govern intellectual
property when we teach them the rules that govern other personal property,
which is to say in elementary school. The problem, though, is that our current
copyright statute could not be taught in elementary school, because elementary
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
becomes shorter, intuitive, and easier to follow. Once the public
begins to understand and comply with copyright law, stronger
copyright protection will follow and the piracy problem will be
significantly reduced.
B. Misconception #2: Copyright Piracy Is
Primarily a Development Issue
Politicians and commentators often link the piracy problem to
the development debate. Southern politicians successfully earn
sympathy from the public by linking piracy to their economic
plight, their citizenry's lack of basic necessities (such as clean
drinking water, food, shelter, electricity, schools, and basic health
care), and the remaining impact of their unfortunate colonial past.
Northern politicians strongly oppose such attempts to use piracy as
a bargaining chip to enhance development agendas. Nevertheless,
to correctly understand the piracy problem, it is important to distill
these emotional and powerful arguments from the existing
copyright piracy debate.
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPs Agreement) includes transitional
provisions that delay implementation of the Agreement in
transitional and less developed countries. 8 The TRIPs Agreement
also requires developed countries to provide incentives for
businesses and institutions to promote and encourage technology
transfer to least developed countries in an effort to create "a sound
and viable technological base" in the beneficiary countries.29
school students couldn't understand it. Indeed, their teachers couldn't
understand it. Copyright lawyers don't understand it. If we are going to teach
the copyright law to schoolchildren, then we need the law to be sensible,
intuitive, and short enough that schoolchildren can hold its essential provisions
in their heads. What we have now is not even close.
LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT, supra note 25, at 72. But see Grand Upright Music Ltd. v.
Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 182, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1991):
"Thou shalt not steal." [sic] has been.an admonition followed since the dawn of
civilization. Unfortunately, in the modern world of business this admonition is
not always followed. Indeed, the defendants in this action for copyright
infringement would have this court believe that stealing is rampant in the music
business and, for that reason, their conduct here should be excused. The conduct
of the defendants herein, however, violates not only the Seventh
Commandment, but also the copyright laws of this country.
28. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, arts. 65(1)-(3), 66(1), Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex tC, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1197, 1222
(1994).
29. Id. art. 66(1).
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However, the TRIPs Agreement is silent on the cost-effectiveness
of intellectual property protection in less developed countries.
The public debate tends to assume that the TRIPs Agreement
reflects universal intellectual property standards. This assumption
is troubling, if not completely wrong. It ignores the fact that the
Agreement may favor developed countries at the expense of less
developed countries.30 Countries differ in terms of their levels of
wealth, economic structures, technological capabilities, political
systems, and cultural traditions. They have different needs and
aspirations and require different intellectual property systems.
Had the level of intellectual property protection been adjusted to
reflect the countries' needs, interests, and conditions, those
transitional provisions in the TRIPs Agreement might not be
needed.3'
30. Commentators discuss extensively the coercive nature of the TRIPs Agreement.
See, e.g., Ruth L. Gana, Has Creativity Died in the Third World? Some Implications of the
Internationalization of Intellectual Property, 24 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 109, 112 (1995)
(examining the implications of the TRIPs Agreement "as a form of passive coercion");
Hamilton, supra note 24, at 614 ("Far from being limited to trade relations, correcting the
international balance of trade, or lowering customs trade barriers, TRIPS attempts to
remake international copyright law in the image of Western copyright law."); Surendra J.
Patel, Can the Intellectual Property Rights System Serve the Interests of Indigenous
Knowledge?, in VALUING LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: INDIGENOUS PEOPLE AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 305, 315-16 (Stephen B. Brush & Doreen Stabinsky
eds., 1996) (arguing that the TRIPs Agreement "universalize[sl the U.S. system of
intellectual property rights"). Some even consider the Agreement "imperialistic." Robert
Burrell, A Case Study in Cultural Imperialism: The Imposition of Copyright on China by
the West, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ETHICS 195, 207 (Lionel Bently & Spyros M.
Maniatis eds., 1998) (discussing the United States's insistence that China adopt
international copyright norms); Hamilton, supra note 24, at 614, 617 (contending that the
TRIPs Agreement could become "one of the most effective vehicles of Western
imperialism in history" and equating the TRIPS Agreement with "freedom imperialism");
J.H. Reichman, Intellectual Property in International Trade: Opportunities and Risks of a
GATT Connection, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 747, 813 (1989) ("Imposition of foreign
legal standards on unwilling states in the name of 'harmonization' remains today what
Ladas deemed it in 1975, namely, a polite form of economic imperialism." (citing 1
STEVEN P. LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND RELATED RIGHTS: NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 14-15 (1975)); SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF
CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER 184 (1996) (noting that "[wlhat
is universalism to the West is imperialism to the rest."); Susan Strange, Cave! hic dragones:
A Critique of Regime Analysis, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 340 (Stephen D. Krasner
ed., 1983) (arguing that the American policy is a form of "nonterritorial imperialism").
31. Cf. J.H. Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers: Global Competition
Under the TRIPS Agreement, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 11, 25 (1997) [hereinafter
Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers] ("[A]dherence to the TRIPS Agreement
requires these same [less developed] . . . countries to reconcile their own economic
development goals with its international intellectual property norms."); A. Samuel Oddi,
The International Patent System and Third World Development Reality or Myth?, 1987
DUKE L.J. 831 (1987) (arguing that the Paris Convention and the international patent
system incur significant social costs to less developed countries).
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
The presumptions that stronger intellectual property
protection will benefit less developed countries and that a
universalized intellectual property regime would maximize global
welfare are questionable.' Equally doubtful is the assumption that
the current intellectual property system strikes the proper balance
"between incentives to future production, the free flow of
information and the preservation of the public domain in the
interest of potential future creators. 33 As Professor Jerome
Reichman noted, "policymakers concerned to promote investment
in important new technologies often overstate the supposed
benefits of specific intellectual property regimes while ignoring the
negative economic functions of these regimes in relation to the
complementary operations of competition law generally. 3 4
Moreover, as we learn from the recent debate on copyright
term extension,35 many Americans disagree on the proper balance
between intellectual property protection and the access to
information "needed to spur further innovation and ensure the
citizenry's full participation in our democratic polity. '36 The
European Union and the United States, the leading advocates of
strong international intellectual property protection, also disagree
on a large variety of copyright issues, such as database protection,
the protection of moral rights, fair use, the first sale doctrine, the
32. See Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 22, at 234.
33. JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE
CONSTRUCrION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 124 (1996); see Reichman, From Free
Riders to Fair Followers, supra note 31, at 24 (arguing that policymakers in many
developed countries take the existing levels of innovative strength for granted and
mistakenly promote protectionism).
34. J.H. Reichman, Beyond the Historical Lines of Demarcation: Competition Law,
Intellectual Property Rights, and International Trade After the GA TT's Uruguay Round, 20
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 75, 81 (1993).
35. For discussions of copyright term extension, see generally EXTENDING MICKEY'S
LIFE: ELDRED V. ASHCROFT AND THE COPYRIGHT TERM EXTENSION DEBATE (Peter K.
Yu ed., forthcoming 2004); Symposium, Eldred v. Ashcroft: Intellectual Property,
Congressional Power, and the Constitution, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1 (2002).
36. William P. Alford, How Theory Does-and Does Not-Matter: American
Approaches to Intellectual Property Law in East Asia, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 8, 22
(1994) [hereinafter Alford, How Theory Does-and Does Not-Matter]; see Dennis S.
Karjala, Copyright, Computer Software, and the New Protectionism, 28 JURIMETRICS J. 33,
35 (1987) (arguing that policymakers and the judiciary should not automatically apply the
existing copyright paradigm to computer software); John Perry Barlow, The Economy of
Ideas: A Framework for Patents and Copyrights in the Digital Age (Everything You Know
About Intellectual Property Is Wrong), WIRED, Mar. 1994, at 86 (arguing against the need
for copyright in digital media).
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work-made-for-hire arrangement, and protection against private
copying in the digital environment.37
In sum, it is misleading to argue that copyright piracy is
primarily a development issue. Although copyright piracy occurs
extensively in less developed countries, there is little evidence that
the lack of economic development is the primary cause of
extensive copyright piracy. Rather, the economic plight of these
countries strongly suggests the need for diversity and sensitivity in
developing the international intellectual property regime.
38
37. See Peter K. Yu, Toward a Nonzero-Sum Approach to Resolving Global
Intellectual Property Disputes: What We Can Learn from Mediators, Business Strategists,
and International Relations Theorists, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 569, 625-26 (2002).
38. See ASSAFA ENDESHAW, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICY FOR NON-
INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES 47 (1996) (arguing that less developed countries may be able to
modernize if "they manage to grasp the internal dynamic that operates in each of them
and devise appropriate economic and technological polices, without neglecting social and
political aspects."); id. at 98-142 (outlining a proposal for an intellectual property system in
non-industrial countries); LESTER C. THUROW, BUILDING WEALTH: THE NEW RULES
FOR INDIVIDUALS, COMPANIES, AND NATIONS IN A KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 128
(1999) (arguing that countries with different levels of economic development desire, need,
and should have different intellectual property systems); Vincent Chiappetta, The
Desirability of Agreeing to Disagree: The WTO, TRIPS, International IPR Exhaustion and
a Few Other Things, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 333 (2000) (arguing that countries must "agree to
disagree" during their negotiation of a multilateral intellectual property regime); Carlos
M. Correa, Harmonization of Intellectual Property Rights in Latin America: Is There Still
Room for Differentiation?, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 109, 129 (1997)
("Differentiation ... looks desirable in that it permits countries in the Latin tradition to
retain a system that responds to their own cultural perceptions of creation and protects the
moral and economic rights of all interested parties."); Claudio Frischtak, Harmonization
Versus Differentiation in Intellectual Property Rights Regimes, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 89 (Mitchel B.
Wallerstein et al. eds., 1993) (arguing that countries should tailor their intellectual
property system by taking into account their economic needs, productive and research
capabilities, and institutional and budgetary constraints); Janet H. MacLaughlin et al., The
Economic Significance of Piracy, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: GLOBAL
CONSENSUS, GLOBAL CONFLICT? 89 (R. Michael Gadbaw & Timothy J. Richards eds.,
1988) (examining whether intellectual property protection is of net benefit to the less
developed countries); Oddi, supra note 31, at 866-74 (outlining a proposal for a patent
system in less developed countries); Robert M. Sherwood et al., Promotion of
Inventiveness in Developing Countries Through a More Advanced Patent Administration,
39 IDEA 473 (1999) (explaining how to restructure the patent administration in ways that
can maximize the contribution of inventors to economic growth and sustained
development); Robert Sherwood, Why a Uniform Intellectual Property System Makes
Sense for the World, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 68, 68 (Mitchel B. Wallerstein et al. eds., 1993) ("The first
characteristic of the uniform system being proposed is that the specific intellectual
property systems of individual countries need not be identical."); David Silverstein,
Intellectual Property Rights, Trading Patterns and Practices, Wealth Distribution,
Development and Standards of Living: A North-South Perspective on Patent Law
Harmonization, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE
SEARCH FOR A BALANCED SYSTEM 155, 156 (George R. Stewart et al. eds., 1994) ("[A]
truly successful IP system must be culturally-specific and responsive to the different
economic and social realities of each country."); id. at 171 ("[Ilt cannot be taken for
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
In fact, less developed countries, however poor they are, have
strong incentives to develop a strong, robust, and dynamic
copyright regime. Such a regime will promote modernization and
economic development, attract foreign investment, and create new
jobs. It will also facilitate transfer of knowledge and technology,
promote indigenous authorship and creation, and generate
considerable tax revenues for the country.39
C. Misconception #3: Copyright Piracy Is a Past Phenomenon for
Technologically-Advanced Countries
In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the
United States, along with Belgium and the Netherlands,4 ° were the
major pirating nations in the world.41 Section 5 of the 1790
Copyright Act stated explicitly that:
[N]othing in this act shall be construed to extend to prohibit the
importation or vending, reprinting or publishing within the
United States, of any map, chart, book or books, written,
printed, or published by any person not a citizen of the United
States, in foreign parts or places without the jurisdiction of the
United States.
4
In 1891, more than a century later, Congress finally enacted
the Chace Act,43 granting copyright protection to foreign authors
from countries that the President proclaimed had offered
Americans reciprocal copyright protection.44 As Barbara Ringer,
granted that a Western IP system will be either beneficial to or successful in other
countries with different cultures.").
39. See Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives, supra note 4, at 62-64.
40. 1 STEPHEN P. LADAS, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND
ARTISTIC PROPERTY: INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND INTER-AMERICAN
COPYRIGHT 27 (1938) (describing Belgium and the Netherlands as "the two principal
'hotbeds' of French piracies").
41. BOYLE, supra note 33, at 2-3 (noting that the United States used to be a major
pirating nation in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries); see also William P.
Alford, Making the World Safe for What? Intellectual Property Rights, Human Rights and
Foreign Economic Policy in the Post-European Cold War World, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 135, 146 (1997) [hereinafter ALFORD, Making the World Safe for What?] (stating that
the United States has been "notorious for its singular" and "cavalier attitude toward the
intellectual property of foreigners" during the time when it was a less developed country);
Thomas Bender & David Sampliner, Poets, Pirates, and the Creation of American
Literature, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 255 (1997) (stating that the United States failed to
observe foreign intellectual property rights during its formative period and did not sign
any international intellectual property agreements until the end of the nineteenth
century).
42. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 5, 1 Stat. 124 (1850) (emphasis added).
43. International Copyright Act of 1891 (Chace Act), ch. 565, 26 Stat. 1106 (1891)
(repealed by Copyright Act of 1909).
44. Id. Section 13 provides:
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then-Assistant Register of Copyrights, summarized in the late
1960s:
Until the Second World War the United States had little reason
to take pride in its international copyright relations; in fact, it
had a great deal to be ashamed of. With few exceptions its role
in international copyright was marked by intellectual
shortsightedness, political isolationism, and narrow economic
self-interest.
4 5
Although commentators generally acknowledge the United
States's shameful past as a major copyright pirate, they usually
dismiss this unfortunate piece of history by pointing out how times
have changed and why the United States's past conduct is
irrelevant. They explain that the country's unfortunate past as a
pirating nation reflected the zeitgeist of that era, rather than
evidenced piracy as a natural-and legitimate-course of
development for a less developed country.46 After all, it is unfair
and unappealing to argue that the United States should stop
complaining about slavery and human trafficking today because of
its prior acceptance of such inhumane practices.
While this "past phenomenon" argument worked well over
the last few decades, recent developments concerning MP3 piracy
in the United States significantly weakened the argument.47 In this
regard, the United States is not much different from a less
developed country or from itself two centuries ago. A recent
That this act shall only apply to a citizen or subject of a foreign state or nation
when such foreign state or nation permits to citizens of the United States of
America the benefit of copyright on substantially the same basis as its own
citizens; or when such foreign state or nation is a party to an international
agreement which provides for reciprocity in the granting of copyright, by the
terms of which agreement the United States of America may, at its pleasure,
become a party to such agreement.
Id. §13. "This system [of Presidential proclamations] has proved cumbersome and
ineffective in comparison with the simplicity, certainty, and other advantages offered by
multilateral arrangements." Ringer, The Role of the United States in International
Copyright, supra note 14, at 1058; see also Roger C. Dixon, Universal Copyright
Convention and United States Bilateral Copyright Arrangements, in UNIVERSAL
COPYRIGHT CONVENTION ANALYZED 113, 118-23 (Theodore R. Kupferman & Matthew
Foner eds., 1955) (discussing the advantages of the Universal Copyright Convention over
the system of bilateral proclamation arrangements).
45. Ringer, The Role of the United States in International Copyright, supra note 14, at
1051.
46. But see ENDESHAW, supra note 38, at 120 (noting that "[h]istorically, each of the
advanced countries today was determined to industrialize first before either 'opening up'
to forces and interests that they might previously have dreaded and before calling for a
stronger international IP system").
47. See Peter K. Yu, The Copyright Divide, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 331, 374-401 (2003)
[hereinafter Yu, The Copyright Divide] (discussing music piracy in twenty-first-century
cyberspace).
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Business Software Alliance study indicated that the U.S. software
industry lost $1.96 billion in the United States alone in 2002, an
amount slightly lower than the total retail software revenues lost in
China during the same period.48 The study also noted that pirated
products constituted nearly one-quarter of all computer software
used in the United States.49 While one understandably might be
skeptical of figures supplied by a self-interested industry, few
would deny that there is a serious piracy problem on the Internet.
Some might even wonder whether the United States will regain its
notoriety as the biggest pirate in the world given its leadership in
developing cutting-edge reproduction technologies and having the
largest Internet population in the world.
D. Misconception #4: Copyright Piracy Is a
Necessary Byproduct of Authoritarian Rule
Copyright protection goes hand in hand with freedom of
expression. Societies that do not respect individual rights are
unlikely to tolerate private expressions or expressive activities.5 °
Thus, authoritarian societies have limited needs for an effective
copyright system, as they do not need to provide incentives for
people to express themselves. Indeed, commentators note "an
intimate link" between individual rights and a copyright system
that values and promotes individual creativity. 51 For example,
48. BUSINESS SOFTWARE ALLIANCE, EIGHTH ANNUAL BSA GLOBAL SOFTWARE
PIRACY STUDY: TRENDS IN SOFTWARE PIRACY 1994-2002, at 9-10 (2003), available at
http://global.bsa.org/globalstudy/2003GSPS.pdf [hereinafter BSA GLOBAL SOFTWARE
PIRACY STUDY]; see also $22 Million of Alleged Counterfeit Microsoft Software Seized in
Pennsylvania; State Troopers, Following Leads About Stolen Laptops, Uncover Huge
Worldwide Counterfeiting Operation, PR NEWSWIRE, June 12, 2000, LEXIS, News
Library, Allnws File (reporting on the investigation and discovery of a significant
counterfeit distribution operation in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania).
49. BSA GLOBAL SOFTWARE PIRACY STUDY, supra note 48, at 7 (stating that
twenty-three percent of all software in use in the United States is pirated).
50. See Alford, How Theory Does-and Does Not-Matter, supra note 36, at 17-18;
see also Naigen Zhang, Intellectual Property Law in China: Basic Policy and New
Developments, 4 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 6-7 (1997) (attributing the delay of
implementing copyright law to "China's concern about the control of publications"). As
Dean Garten explained:
If foreign governments do not seek to protect basic human rights, they are more
likely to ignore or circumvent other basic laws of great commercial relevance,
such as those that protect intellectual property rights, combat corruption, and
mandate the disclosure of critical financial information. The arrogance of
governments that oppress their people transfers easily to other areas.
Jeffrey E. Garten, Business and Foreign Policy, FOREIGN AFF., May/June 1997, at 67, 75.
51. See Hamilton, supra note 24, at 618; Barbara Ringer, Two Hundred Years of
American Copyright Law, in TWO HUNDRED YEARS OF ENGLISH AND AMERICAN
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Professor Marci Hamilton noted that one must accept at least
some version of individualism, reward, and commodification to
believe in intellectual property rights.1
2
Consider, for example, China, which has been widely
criticized for its lack of intellectual property protection and its
authoritarian rule. China's government strictly controls the
dissemination of information and distribution of media products
53
that it considers instruments of political indoctrination and mass
mobilization.54 Today, the media and publishing industries remain
the most heavily regulated businesses in the country. One can find
severe restrictions on imported films, 55 books and audiovisual
products,56 and the Internet.57 Due to these restrictions, many
media products are unavailable despite heavy demand. Consumers
therefore have to settle for black market products or pirated
goods, which are often inferior to, and sometimes are
PATENT, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT LAW 117, 118 (1977) ("We know, empirically, that
strong copyright systems are characteristic of relatively free societies.").
52. See Hamilton, supra note 24, at 617 ("Individualism, as captured in the Western
intellectual property system, is the sine qua non for a society to recognize and honor
personal liberty.").
53. YUEZHI ZHAO, MEDIA, MARKET, AND DEMOCRACY IN CHINA: BETWEEN THE
PARTY LINE AND THE BOT'OM LINE 19 (1998) (noting that the Chinese Communist Party
"exercised strict control over its publications from the very beginning"); see Shaozhi Su,
Chinese Communist Ideology and Media Control, in CHINA'S MEDIA, MEDIA'S CHINA 75,
77 (Chin-Chuan Lee ed., 1994) (noting that the Chinese Communist Party "pays utmost
attention to ideology"); Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives, supra note 4, at 28-29. But
see generally DANIEL C. LYNCH, AFTER THE PROPAGANDA STATE: MEDIA, POLITICS,
AND "THOUGHT WORK" IN REFORMED CHINA (1999) (describing how a combination of
property rights reforms, administrative fragmentation, and technological advance has
caused the Chinese authorities to lose some of its control over propagandistic
communication).
54. ZHAO, supra note 53, at 2; Su, supra note 53, at 77 (noting that media not only has
the ability to create an atmosphere conducive to political development, but also can help
mobilize the masses and foster political struggle).
55. See generally Mary Lynne Calkins, Censorship in Chinese Cinema, 21 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 239, 291-96 (1999) (discussing the importation and censorship of non-
Chinese films in China).
56. See Anna S.F. Lee, The Censorship and Approval Process for Media Products in
China, in PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA 127, 148 (Mary L.
Riley ed., 1997); Mary L. Riley, The Regulation of the Media in China, in CHINESE
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 7, at 355, 377.
57. See Nina Hachigian, China's Cyber-Strategy, FOREIGN AFF., Mar./Apr. 2001, at
118; Jack Linchuan Qiu, Virtual Censorship in China: Keeping the Gate Between the
Cyberspaces, 4 INT'L J. COMM. L. & POL'Y 1 (1999); Jiang-yu Wang, The Internet and E-
Commerce in China: Regulations, Judicial Views, and Government Policies, THE
COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW, Jan. 2001, at 12; Peter K. Yu, Barriers to Foreign
Investment in the Chinese Internet Industry, GIGALAW.COM, at
http://www.gigalaw.com/articles/2001/yu-2001-03-pl.html (Mar. 2001) (discussing content
regulations in the Chinese Internet Industry).
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indistinguishable from, the genuine products. 8 As the Chinese
market becomes saturated with infringing substitutes, foreign
manufacturers and distributors have a difficult time entering the
market, even if the restrictions are removed or relaxed.5 9
Under this theory, government censorship arguably promotes
piracy. As one commentator acknowledged:
It is laughable to hear excuses from Beijing that they can't
control the 50 pirate CD factories. If they were turning out
thousands of copies of the BBC documentary on the
Tiananmen Square protest-rather than bootleg copies of "The
Lion King"-the factory managers would be sharing a cell with
other dissidents in a heartbeat.
However, authoritarian rule is a double-edged sword and can
be effective in eradicating social ills. In the early 1990s, Chinese
authorities, to the dismay of human rights advocates, enlisted help
from some of their toughest law enforcers to clean up pirate
factories. 61 To create a deterrent effect and demonstrate their
eagerness to eradicate piracy to the West, the Chinese authorities
imposed the death penalty and life imprisonment on infringers in
severe cases.
62
58. PETER K. Yu, THE SECOND COMING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN
CHINA 24 (Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, OCCASIONAL PAPERS IN
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY NO. 11, 2002); Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives, supra
note 4, at 31-32.
59. As one commentator explained:
If the Chinese more fully relaxed or lifted barriers to market participation by
foreign [intellectual property rights] owners, those foreign owners could sell
their own goods in China and thereby displace, at least to some extent, pirate
products that now have Chinese markets to themselves. Moreover, absent such
barriers, some U.S. producers could both sell their "authentic" products in the
Chinese market, and also monitor, if not police, infringement themselves on an
in-country basis. Such market access adjustments would have application in a
number of areas.
Glenn R. Butterton, Pirates, Dragons and US. Intellectual Property Rights in China:
Problems and Prospects of Chinese Enforcement, 38 ARIz. L. REV. 1081, 1105 (1996).
60. James Shinn, The China Crunch; Three Crises Loom in the Next 30 Days, WASH.
POST, Feb. 18, 1996, at C1. But see Daniel C.K. Chow, Counterfeiting in the People's
Republic of China, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 4-5 (2000) ("[T]here are real political and social
costs associated with any serious crackdown on a problem as massive as counterfeiting.
Overcoming local protectionism will require the expenditure of considerable political
capital and divert limited resources from China's myriad other pressing problems.").
61. See ALFORD, TO STEAL A BOOK Is AN ELEGANT OFFENSE, supra note 4, at 143.
62. See id. at 91 (stating that China has imposed the death penalty on at least four
individuals, life sentences on no fewer than five others, and imprisonment on some 500
people for trademark violations); Tom Korski, China Sentences Three to Life in Prison for
CD Piracy in Harshest Sanction So Far, PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. DAILY
(BNA), at D-2 (Dec. 11, 1997).
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Commentators have expressed concerns over the
deterioration of intellectual property protection after China's
accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). In the post-
WTO accession environment, China can no longer use traditional
barriers and measures to protect its economy. For example,
restrictions on export privileges will be greatly reduced. As a
result, pirates and counterfeiters may trade more aggressively with
countries that have strong markets for low-priced counterfeit
goods, such as Southeast Asia and Eastern Europe.63 Thus,
although the country has fewer restrictions and barriers because of
its entry to the WTO, China's intellectual property protection may
not improve.
III. RECONFIGURING THE PUBLIC DEBATE
While it is important to recognize and understand the
common misconceptions about copyright piracy, it is more
important to put piracy in perspective. To help reconfigure the
existing copyright piracy debate, this Article introduces a new
construct called the "copyright divide." 64
A. Understanding the Copyright Divide
The copyright divide is the gap between those who have
stakes in the copyright regime and those who do not. The
stakeholders are eager to protect what they have under the
existing regime. They not only consider piracy annoying, but see it
as theft. By contrast, nonstakeholders neither understand
copyright laws nor benefit from the regime. Nonstakeholders
consider piracy fair, acceptable, and logical. Some of them even
perceive piracy as a market-correction mechanism that helps put
stakeholders in their rightful position. To these people, piracy is a
safeguard that helps prevent the powerful from dominating their
less powerful counterparts.
Using this construct, piracy therefore can be seen as a battle
between stakeholders and nonstakeholders over the change and
retention of the status quo. Unless the nonstakeholders
understand that copyright needs to be protected or until they
become stakeholders or potential stakeholders, they will not abide
by copyright laws or consent to stronger copyright protection.
Stakeholders want to protect what they have, while
nonstakeholders are eager to enlarge their share to become
63. DANIEL C.K. CHOW, A PRIMER ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT ENTERPRISES AND
PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN CHINA 254 (2002).
64. See generally Yu, The Copyright Divide, supra note 47.
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stakeholders. However, not everybody steals or uses illegal means
to enlarge his or her share. Most people do so only when they do
not understand the law or when they do not believe in the
system-for example, when they perceive the system as grossly
unfair.65 To help bridge the copyright divide, this Article proposes
four areas on which policymakers, government leaders,
intergovernmental organization officials, and industry executives
can focus their remedial efforts.66
First, policymakers must educate nonstakeholders about the
copyright system.67  They need to make nonstakeholders
understand what copyright is, how it is protected, and why they
need to protect such property. Policymakers also need to show
nonstakeholders the benefits of copyright protection-how such
protection can help them and how the lack thereof can hurt them.
An example of such educational material is the controversial
"just say yes" to licensing campaign outlined in the Information
Infrastructure Task Force White Paper released by the Clinton• • • 68
administration. As the White Paper explained:
Certain core concepts should be introduced at the elementary
school level-at least during initial instructions on computers
or the Internet, but perhaps even before such instruction. For
example, the concepts of property and ownership are easily
explained to children because they can relate to the underlying
notions of property-what is "mine" versus what is "not mine,"
just as they do for a jacket, a ball, or a pencil.69
65. See Litman, Copyright Noncompliance, supra note 24, at 238-39; Hamilton, supra
note 24, at 616 ("Intellectual property is nothing more than a socially-recognized, but
imaginary, set of fences and gates. People must believe in it for it to be effective.");
Faison, supra note 24 ("We take copyright violations very seriously, but when it comes to
copying a disk, most Chinese people don't see what's wrong." (quoting Xu Guoji, a senior
official in Shanghai's Industrial and Commercial Administration)).
66. The examples in this Part focus primarily on piracy problems in less developed
countries. For a discussion on how the entertainment industry can stem the Internet piracy
problem, see Peter K. Yu, The Escalating Copyright Wars, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV.331, 401-
37 (2003).
67. See COMMITIEE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE EMERGING
INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE DIGITAL
DILEMMA: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 16-17 (2000)
[hereinafter THE DIGITAL DILEMMA] ("[T]he public welfare would be well served by a
program of education explaining why respect for copyright is beneficial for society as a
whole.., and detailing both the privileges and limitations of copyright protection.").
68. INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING
GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 208 (1995) (describing the "just say yes"
to licensing campaign).
69. Id. at 205.
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Although commentators severely criticized this campaign,70
the White Paper underscored the need and importance of
education in the intellectual property arena. The National
Research Council reemphasized this need in a recent study,7'
which stated: "[A] better understanding of the basic principles of
copyright law would lead to greater respect for this law and greater
willingness to abide by it, as well as produce a more informed
public better able to engage in discussions about intellectual
property and public policy.
72
This need becomes even more important in countries that
lack a sophisticated legal system or that have limited respect for
the rule of law. Unfortunately, in these countries, neither the
governments of industrialized countries nor multinational
corporations are interested in funding and organizing awareness
and educational campaigns. 3 Political systems of industrialized
countries tend to reward short-term results, rather than long-term
results. Thus, policymakers are reluctant to focus on long-term
policies, such as providing education at the grassroots level. In
addition, education is a public good. Most governments and
companies tend to free ride on each other's efforts without
incurring any substantial investment.74
Second, companies in less developed countries thus far are
reluctant to protect intellectual property rights of their foreign
joint venture partners. This reluctance is due to both their limited
understanding of intellectual property and suspicion of foreign
partners and their intentions. Once they learn more about
70. See Peter Jaszi, Caught in the Net of Copyright, 75 OR. L. REv. 299, 299 (1996)
(noting that the copyright awareness section in the White Paper "is an excellent example
of a good idea gone wrong"); Litman, Copyright Noncompliance, supra note 24, at 243
(criticizing the White Paper).
71. THE DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 67, at 16-17.
72. Id.
73. ALFORD, Making the World Safe for What?, supra note 41, at 142 (noting that
"[flor all its much ballyhooed expressions of concern, neither the U.S. government nor
many of the companies driving [the U.S. foreign intellectual property] policy . . .have
made any substantial attempt ... to communicate to the Chinese why better intellectual
property protection would be in their interest..."); Chow, supra note 60, at 46 (noting
that "brand owners are reluctant to commit the amount of resources necessary to achieve
these goals or to risk seriously offending the Chinese government"); see also Hu, supra
note 4, at 111 ("[A]ctive involvement by U.S. companies and lawyers, for example through
special seminars, exchange programs, mock proceedings, and other assistance to the
Chinese media, will expedite the training process."). One commentator argued that "U.S.
Companies must take a proactive stance and not be content to rely on government for
help." Eric M. Griffin, Note, Stop Relying on Uncle Sam!-A Proactive Approach to
Copyright Protection in the People's Republic of China, 6 TEx. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 169, 190
(1998).
74. See Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 22, at 223.
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intellectual property and understand their stakes within the
copyright system, they may change their perception and position.
The mutual benefit of increasing awareness through
education and creating stakes in the industry is exemplified by the
following example concerning a U.S.-China joint venture. In the
beginning, the Chinese partner was unwilling to allocate a portion
of the joint venture profits to the foreign partner for design fees.
The Chinese partner's reaction was natural and understandable; it
understood neither intellectual property protection nor the
intentions behind the foreign partner's action. Once the foreign
partner explained to the Chinese manufacturer that it could charge
separately for its design work and helped the manufacturer
determine the cost of its own design processes, the Chinese partner
became receptive to the idea of allocating profits for intellectual
property rights. It even actively lobbied local regulators for the
right to design fees.
75
Third, policymakers must help develop intellectual property
laws and strengthen enforcement mechanisms. Today, most
countries have intellectual property laws that comply with
international standards; however, very few of these countries
provide strong enforcement of intellectual property laws. Thus,
policymakers need to work with their counterparts in these
countries to strengthen intellectual property laws and develop
effective enforcement mechanisms. The U.S. government used
coercive tactics in the past to induce-and perhaps compel-
foreign countries to change their laws in the American image. Yet
past experience suggests that such changes would not be complete
or sustainable until these countries consider themselves
stakeholders or potential stakeholders in the international
intellectual property system.76
Policymakers need to help nonstakeholders develop a stake in
the system and understand how they can protect their products
and receive royalties. For example, policymakers could help
nonstakeholder countries develop a local pharmaceutical industry,
or a record industry. By doing so, nonstakeholders will be
transformed into stakeholders or potential stakeholders.
75. John Donaldson & Rebecca Weiner, Swashbuckling the Pirates: A'
Communications-Based Approach to IPR Protection in China, in CHINESE
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 7, at 409, 420.
76. See Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 22, at 207-11; Yu, Piracy, Prejudice,
and Perspectives, supra note 4, at 71-72; see also SUSAN K. SELL, POWER AND IDEAS:
NORTH-SOUTH POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST 13 (1998)
(noting the sharp distinction between overt coercion and persuasion in the American
foreign intellectual property and antitrust policies).
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Finally, policymakers, in particular those in the copyright
industries, must help develop honest and affordable alternatives to
meet the needs of the local people. It is disturbing that American
software is more expensive abroad-often in less developed
countries-than it is in the United States. 7 As Gene Hoffman, the
CEO of Emusic, Inc., said: "We think the best way to stop piracy is
to make music so cheap it isn't worth copying. ' '7 8 Indeed, it would
be hard to imagine why foreign nationals who earn fifty dollars a
month would spend half of their monthly salary to buy a twenty
dollar book.79
Fortunately, many companies already understand this
problem and use bargain pricing to fight piracy.80 Some movie
studios, for example, released audiovisual products dubbed in the
local language or with added foreign-language subtitles81 to make
their products more affordable. On the one hand, these bargain
products provide an affordable alternative that accommodates
local needs. On the other hand, by dubbing the original products in
the local language or including subtitles, the studios successfully
make the discounted products unappealing to consumers in the
English-speaking world. This strategy successfully prevents
bargain products from entering the country as parallel imports.
82
77. Kenneth Ho, A Study into the Problem of Software Piracy in Hong Kong and
China 2.6 (1995), at http://info.gov.hk/ipd/eng/information/studyaids/piracy-hk-
china.htm (noting that legitimate copies of software are twenty percent more' expensive in
Hong Kong than they are in the United States).
78. THE DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 67, at 80.
79. Alford, How Theory Does-and Does Not-Matter, supra note 36, at 13
(emphasizing how unlikely a Chinese person "earning fifty dollars a month would be to
fork out more than a month's salary to buy even such an outstanding work as Melville
Nimmer and Paul Geller's treatise on worldwide copyright"); see also MICHAEL P. RYAN,
KNOWLEDGE DIPLOMACY: GLOBAL COMPETITION AND THE POLITICS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 80 (1998) ("Chinese officials defended the book piracy by
claiming that people are too poor to pay for Western books, 'yet we must obtain this
knowledge so that we can develop our economy."').
80. See RYAN, supra note 79, at 80-81; see also Donaldson & Weiner, supra note 75, at
433 (asserting that one approach to stop piracy is to offer the affected people a legitimate
way to earn a living). For discussions of price discrimination in the copyright context, see
generally Harold Demsetz, The Private Production of Public Goods, 13 J.L. & ECON. 293
(1970); Wendy J. Gordon, Intellectual Property as Price Discrimination: Implications for
Contract, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1367 (1998); Michael J. Meurer, Copyright Law and Price
Discrimination, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 55 (2001).
81. Don Groves, Warner Bros., MGM Dip into China vid Market, DAILY VARIETY,
Feb. 21, 1997, at 1 (stating that Warner Bros. and MGM have entered a licensing deal with
a Chinese government-owned conglomerate to release low-priced video products dubbed
in Mandarin).
82. For discussion of gray-market goods, see generally Margreth Barrett, The United
States' Doctrine of Exhaustion: Parallel Imports of Patented Goods, 27 N. KY. L. REV. 911
(2000) (examining U.S. policy on parallel imports); Shubha Ghosh, An Economic Analysis
of the Common Control Exception to Gray Market Exclusion, 15 U. PA. J. INT'L BUS. L.
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
B. The Chicken-or-Egg Problem
In theory, if policymakers focus on the above areas, they can
bridge the copyright divide. In reality, however, it is not easy to
transform nonstakeholders into stakeholders or potential
stakeholders. Even if policymakers are able to devise a
comprehensive strategy, the transformation process will be further
complicated by the existence of diverse interests of various
stakeholders. A recent study by the National Research Council
noted:
The debate over intellectual property includes almost everyone,
from authors and publishers, to consumers (e.g., the reading,
listening, and viewing public), to libraries and educational
institutions, to governmental and standards bodies. Each of the
stakeholders has a variety of concerns . . . that are at times
aligned with those of other stakeholders, and at other times
opposed. An individual stakeholder may also play multiple
roles with various concerns. At different times, a single
individual may be an author, reader, consumer, teacher, or
shareholder in publishing or entertainment companies; a
member of an editorial board; or an officer of a scholarly
society that relies on publishing for revenue. The dominant
concern will depend on the part played at the moment.83
In today's political reality, the United States will likely run
into a chicken-or-egg problem. As evidenced by U.S. copyright
history, the copyright industry consistently lobbies for legislation
that protects their economic interests. Because they are eager to
maximize profits for their shareholders, they are unlikely to lobby
for a regime that protects nonstakeholders. Unless
nonstakeholders have power to lobby for legislation that suits their
needs too, they-as Professor Jessica Litman noted-will have a
very difficult time getting the legislation they want.84 In the end,
nonstakeholders will not become stakeholders or potential
stakeholders, and they will have no incentive to support stronger
copyright protection. Thus, the United States will likely confront a
vicious cycle.
373 (1994) (providing an overview of the law and economics of gray markets); Seth
Lipner, Trademarked Goods and Their Gray Market Equivalents: Should Product
Differences Result. in the Barring of Unauthorized Goods from the U.S. Markets?, 18
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1029 (1990) (discussing whether gray-market goods are justifiably
excluded from U.S. markets).
83. THE DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 67, at 51.
84. Litman, Copyright Noncompliance, supra note 24, at 242.
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Despite our general aversion toward authoritarian rule and
the belief that copyright piracy flourishes in authoritarian
countries, the chicken-or-egg problem, ironically, will be largely
reduced or absent from command economies. In a command
economy, the government can decide the type of economic policy
it desires, the type of resources it wants to allocate, or even
whether it wants to use copyright piracy as a competitive strategy.
When Chinese authorities closed down pirate factories, their
efficiency amazed many industry executives. How happy would the
recording industry be if copyright owners could close down
MP3.com, Napster, and KaZaA without long and arduous legal
battles!
Notwithstanding these differences, command economies exist
more in name than in practice today. Even China, one of the very
few remaining Communist countries in the world, recently joined
the WTO and is making the transition from a command economy
to a market economy.
85
IV. CONCLUSION
Today, copyright piracy is a major transnational problem. To
generate support for quick legislative and executive actions, the
public debate often oversimplifies the issue. It either exaggerates a
particular aspect of the problem or offers an abbreviated, easy-to-
understand, yet misleading version of the story. Such
oversimplification is dangerous. It creates misconceptions that
confuse the public as to the cause and extent of the problem. It
also misleads policymakers into finding remedies that fail to attack
the crux of the piracy problem.
Copyright piracy is not primarily a cultural problem or a
development issue. Nor is it a necessary byproduct of authoritarian
rule. Rather, copyright piracy is a battle between stakeholders and
nonstakeholders over the change and retention of the status quo.
It is as relevant today as it was two centuries ago, when the United
States was a major pirating nation.
To help reconfigure the misguided public debate on copyright
piracy, this Article underscores the need to focus on the copyright
divide-the gap between those who have stakes in the copyright
regime and those who do not. Until nonstakeholders are
85. For discussions of China's entry into the WTO, see generally GORDON G.
CHANG, THE COMING COLLAPSE OF CHINA (2001); NICHOLAS R. LARDY,
INTEGRATING CHINA INTO THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2002); SUPACHAI PANITCHPAKDI
& MARK L. CLIFFORD, CHINA AND THE WTO: CHANGING CHINA, CHANGING WORLD
TRADE (2002); Symposium, China and the WTO: Progress, Perils, and Prospects, 17
COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1 (2003).
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transformed into stakeholders or potential stakeholders, copyright
piracy will remain rampant. If the United States is to avoid the
chicken-or-egg problem, its policymakers must start thinking
about changing the copyright lawmaking process to account for the
interests of both stakeholders and nonstakeholders.
